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IN THE UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Appellate Court No. 94024-CA
v.
Priority #2
JOSEPH P. POWANSNIK
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over final orders
entered by the District Court pursuant Utah code Annotated (1953 as
amended), § 78-2a-3

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

WHETHER A PROVISION UNDER UTAH CODE § 58-37-8(5) (b) WHICH
PROVIDES FOR A GREATER PENALTY FOR CONVICTION OF A CRIME
AS IDENTIFIED UNDER UTAH LEGISLATION, IF THE ACT IS
COMMITTED WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A PUBLIC PARK IS A SEPARATE
OFFENSE, THUS REQUIRING PROOF DURING TRIAL, OR IS A
SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT?

II.

WHETHER THE JUDGE EXCEEDED HIS SCOPE WHEN
ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE BY JUDICIAL NOTICE THE
POLICE MEASUREMENT OF THE RESIDENCE BEING
WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A PUBLIC PARK?

III. ASSUMING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE POLICE
MEASUREMENT IS IMPERMISSIBLE, WHETHER THE
PROSECUTION ESTABLISHED THE PROPER FOUNDATION
FOR ADMISSION OF THE FINDING THAT THE
RESIDENCE WAS WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A PARK?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUES I, II, & III

The Utah Court of Appeals should treat the trial court's
conclusion and the admissibility of evidence as a question of law.
State v. Mickelson, 848 P. 2d 677 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991). The court shall "review
such questions for correctness, according no particular deference
to the trial court. State v. V.G.P. . 845 P. 2d 944 (Ut. Ct. App.
1992); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d
884, 887 (Utah 1988) . In addition, the Court, in reviewing the
trial court's conclusions of law, shall apply "a correction of
error standard with no deference to the trial court." Hansen v.
Dept. Of Fin. Insts. , 858 P.2d 184, 185-86 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993);
Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 680 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989) . Also,
statutory construction presents a question of law, which the court
reviews for correctness. Scudder v. Kennecott, Inc. 858 P.2d 1005,
1009 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993); Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd., 771 P.2d
1033, 1038 (Utah 1989).
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant, Joseph P. Powasnik, at the residence of one,
DeAnne Cain, a girlfriend, was alleged to have been, in conjunction
with DeAnne Cain, using the location at 207 South 200 East, Logan,
Utah, for the distribution of methamphetamine. Using police a UHF
Frequency Scanner law enforcement officers monitored telephone
conversations from Third party(s) to DeAnne Cain's residence.
Based on the information received therein, search warrants and
warrants for arrest were issued and various individuals were
arrested including DeAnne Cain and Joseph P. Powasnik. DeAnne Cain
and at least one other Defendant entered a guilty pleas to reduced
charges, pursuant to plea negotiations which included in part, the
promise to give testimony against the Defendant herein, Joseph P.
Powasnik.

The search warrant revealed the evidence of materials

that was alleged to be drug paraphanalia as well as substance that
was, according to testimony, a lab at Weber State College to be the
controlled substance of methamphetamine. Subsequent to the arrest
the Defendant was incarcerated and based on alleged probation
violation remained incarcerated until the time of the trial and
final sentencing.

a.

NATURE OF THE CASE

The alleged distribution of a controlled substance to wit:
methamphetamine was charged as a second degree felony and enhanced
to a first degree felony as a result of the allegations that the
3

alleged sale or distribution took place within a thousand feet of
a park. It is the enhancement of the charge which is the subject of
this appeal.

b.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Defendant,
preliminary

after

multiple

arraignments

and

hearing was granted a conflict

of

scheduling

interest

of

public

defender to represent him in preliminary hearing and subsequently
bound over to the First District Court for proceedings before the
Honorable Judge Gordon Low.

C.

DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT

1.

Trial

respective
treating

Court

attorneys

the

through

Judge

for Plaintiff

enhancement

to be

a

Gordon

and

Low

Defendant

sentencing

advised

the

that

was

matter

he

and

that

evidence regarding enhancement would be heard after the trial and
out of the hearing of the Jury.

Thereafter, pursuant to a Jury

trial, the matter was heard on the 20th day of December, 1994, at
which time, despite disputes in testimony, the Jury verdict of
guilty was entered to a second degree felony of drug distribution
(methamphetamine).

The

enhancement

hearing was conducted

on the

3rd

day of

January, 1995, at which time the judge made a finding that there
was sufficient evidence, that the distribution of methamphetamine,
which was the verdict from the prior Jury trial, occurred with in
4

a thousand feet of a park and was therefore to be enhanced under
Utah Code.

Having thus made the finding the matter was scheduled

for sentencing and Defendant was, thereafter, sentenced to a term
of not less than five years to life with a probation violation
being established and the original sentence that the state entered
and advised for the recommendation to the Board of Pardons that the
sentences run concurrently.

Subsequently, the matter was appealed

by the Defendant.

5

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Despite the disputed testimony regarding the ownership of the
drugs and drug paraphernalia located at the residence of DeAnne
Cain and the party or parties to whom any drug transactions may
have taken place the Jury did, in fact, find the Defendant guilty
of the second degree crime of distribution of a control substance
to wit methamphetamine.
At the time of the enhancement hearing the state called its
witnesses, officer Tim Scott, who's testified that he had been
present at the time of the measurement of the distance of the
residence of DeAnne Cain to the park in question and the officer
conducting

the

measurement

used

a

pedometer.

Testimony

is

disclosed by the transcript disclosed that while he was present he
did

not

do

instrumentality

the

actual

to be used

measurement,

did

for measurements

not

select

and only

attention drawn to the reading on the pedometer.

had

the
his

Counsel for the

Defendant objected to the in conclusion of this testimony on the
basis that it lacked foundation both as to the inclusion of the
reading by virtue of having not been a party to which had actually
conducted the measuring, and in addition, on the basis that he
could not testify that the instrumentality used for the measurement
have

been

calibrated, was

in working order

or to how

it was

selected for use or any of its history.
Notwithstanding the objection, the Judge hearing the matter
accepted

the evidence and as an additional
6

factor found that,

because of his own personal knowledge of that locality

(having

passed papers as a young boy), took judicial notice that the blocks
in that area were approximately 800 feet and that therefore the
Cain residence was in fact within a 1,000 feet of the park.
The

court

erred

in

treating

the

enhancement

as

a

mere

sentencing enhancement and not an element of the crime, and in
allowing the inclusion of the evidence from the pedometer for the
measurement of the 1,000 feet for the enhancement, and for taking
judicial notice of facts that were his own personal knowledge but
not within the general knowledge of an ordinary reasonable member
of society.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Defendant-Appellant alleges that the following is a summary of
the arguments which show that the courts order of enhancement,
should be set aside, and the case be remanded for sentencing in
accordance with a conviction for a second degree felony.
The law does not support the trial courts holding in the
above-entitled

action

to

allow

for

the

conviction

of

nor

enhancement to a First Degree Felony.
The 1000 feet within a park is or should be a separately
proven element of the crime charged as a First Degree Felony. This
means

the measurement

of

the

1000

feet

should

be

subject

to

appropriate and discernable safeguard as to its use, which would be
7

the basis for the foundation necessary for its proper inclusion as
credible evidence. Further, the judge should not include those
items within his own personal knowledge as an evidentiary basis for
a decision unless it is clearly within the common knowledge of the
ordinary and reasonable member of society.

POINTS, AUTHORITIES, AND ARGUMENT

I.

UTAH CODE SECTION 58-37-8 (5) (b) WHICH PROVIDES FOR A
GREATER PENALTY FOR CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING
POSSESSION AND/OR DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
CONSTITUTES AN "OFFENSE" WHICH HAS AN ELEMENT OF PROOF
THAT THE ACT COMMITTED TOOK PLACE WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A
PUBLIC PARK.
A person who is convicted under subsection 5(a) of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8 is subject to a greater penalty for the commission
of

any

unlawful

act

involving

controlled

substances

or

drug

paraphernalia if the act is committed within 1,000 feet of any
schools and other specified structures, facilities, or grounds,
including

public

parks.1

The

state

1

legislature

enacted

this

Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(5)(a) - ® provides:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person
not authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to
be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug
Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 3 7b, Imitation
Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the
penalties and classifications under Subsection (5)(b) if the act
is committed:
(I)
in a public or private elementary or secondary school
or on the grounds of any of those schools;
xx

8

statute to enhance criminal penalties for specific conduct. The
statute was enacted "to protect the public health, safety, and
welfare of children of Utah from the presumed extreme potential
danger created when drug transactions occur on or near a school
ground." State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 503 (Utah 1989). See also
United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1222 (D.C. Cir.), cert,
denied, 481 U.S. 1057, 107 S.Ct. 2199, 95 L.Ed.2d 854 (1987) (The
Utah Supreme Court supports its conclusion of the legislature's
intent by use of this case.)
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of those schools
or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or
other structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act,
being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or
institution under Subsections (5) (a) (I) and (ii) ;
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care
facility;
(v)
in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or
recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena,
theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure
adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix)
within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsections (5)(a)(I) through (viii); or
(x)
with a person younger than 18 years of age,
regardless of where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than
five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been
established but for this subsection would have been a first
degree felony. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be
suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole until the
minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been
served.
® If the classification that would otherwise have been
established would have been less than a first degree felony but
for this subsection, a person convicted under this subsection is
guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for
that offense.
9

Utah patterned its sentence enhancement provision after the
federal Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984.
State v. Strombercr, 783 P.2d 54, 59 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989); see 21
U.S.C.A. § 860(a) (Supp. 1993); see also State v. Viqh, 871 P.2d
1030,

1035

(Ut. Ct. App. 1994) .2

Thus, federal case law offers

direction in answering the question as to whether or not Utah Code
section 58-37-8 (5) constitutes an "offense" which has an element
of proof that the act committed took place within a 1,000 feet of
a public park. In the Tenth Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals,

the

Court

recently

found

that

the

district

court

"erroneously withdrew any charge based on that statute from the
jury's consideration in the mistaken belief that section 860 (a)
did not create a substantive offense and was only a sentencing
enhancement." United States v. Ashley, 26 F.3d 1008, 1011

2

(10th

21 U.S.C. § 860 (a) (Supp. IV 1992) reads as follows:
M a ) Penalty
Any person who violates section 841(a) (1) or section 856 of this
title by distributing, possessing with intent to distribute, or
manufacturing a controlled substance in or on, or within one
thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public or
private elementary, vocational, or secondary school of a public
or private college, junior college, or university, or a
playground, or within 100 feet of a public or private youth
center, public swimming pool, or video arcade facility, is
(except as provided in subsection (b) of this section subject to
(1) twice the maximum punishment authorized by section 841(b) of
this title; and (2) at least twice any term of supervised release
authorized by section 841(b) of this title for a first offense. A
fine up to twice that authorized by section 841(b) of this title
may be imposed in addition to any term of imprisonment authorized
by this subsection. Except to the extent a greater minimum
sentence is otherwise provided by section 841(b) of this title, a
person shall be sentenced under this subsection to a term of
imprisonment of not less than one year. The mandatory minimum
sentencing provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to
offenses involving 5 grams or less of marijuana."
10

Cir. 1994) . The Court in supporting its decision agreed with an
earlier Tenth Circuit which stated:
"We agree with those circuits that have concluded that §
860 constitutes an "offense" which has as an element of
proof that the distribution occurred within 1,000 feet of
a protected place. While some circuits construed § 860
before it was renumbered and amended, these differences
do not affect our inquiry. Similarly, § 860(a) includes
as protected places playgrounds and various types of
schools. Some circuits construed the statute in the
school context, yet the analysis of § 860(a) as an
offense would also apply to a playground. See United
States v. Freyre-Lazaro, 3 F.3d 1496, 1507 (11th Cir.
1993)(holding that § 841(a) is a lesser included offense
of § 860); United States v. Scott, 987 F.2d 261, 266 (5th
Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Thornton, 901 F.2d
738, 741 (9th Cir. 1990) (statute "incorporates the
sentencing enhancement element into the underlying
offense"); United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1218
(D.C. Cir.) (statute "adds an element to the offense of
section 841(a)" which must be "proved") , cert denied, 481
U.S. 1057, 107 S.Ct. 2199, 95 L.Ed.2d 854 (1987).
United States v. Smith, 13 F.3d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1993).
The courts within the State of Utah have supported this notion
of an "offense", even though they have not addressed this issue
directly.

In a 1989 case, the Utah Supreme Court

stated

that

"Section 58-37-8 (5) merely enhances the penalty when an aggravating
factor is present." State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1989) .
In

discussing

the

legitimacy

that

a

legislature

may

enhance

criminal penalties for specific conduct in its discretion, the Utah
Court of Appeals concluded that "In this case, the crime for which
defendant

stands

convicted

is

identical

to

the

offense

of

possessing controlled substances, except for the additional element
that the offense must occur within 1,00 0 feet of a school." State
v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 60 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied,
11

795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
Thus, Section 58-37-8(5) constitutes an "offense" which has an
element of proof that the act committed took place within a 1,000
feet of a public park and should be proven by the prosecution
during the course of a jury trial.

II.
THE JUDGE EXCEEDED HIS SCOPE WHEN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE
BY JUDICIAL NOTICE THE POLICE MEASUREMENT OF DEFENDANT'S
RESIDENCE BEING WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A PUBLIC PARK.
Rule 201(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that "a judicially
noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that
it

is

either

(1)

generally

known

jurisdiction of the trial court or

within

the

territorial

(2) capable of accurate and

ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned. In determining the meaning of this rule,
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: " In short, a court is presumed
to know what every man of ordinary intelligence must know about
such things." Little Cottonwood Water Co. V. Kimball, 28 9 P. 116
(Utah 1930); see also Defusion Co. V. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n,
613 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1980). Thus, a court can take judicial notice
of things which are commonly known. This should be distinguished
from judicial knowledge of public records, laws, etc which the
court is deemed to know by virtue of its office.
In the present case before this court, the trial court judge
took

judicial

residence

notice of the police measurement

being

within

1,000

feet
12

of

a

of

public

defendant's
park.

This

determination is based on the judge's presumed knowledge that a
standard block in the county is 800 feet; the park is 1 block from
the defendant's residence; the judge's personal familiarity with
the area; and an officer's determination

that

the

defendant's

residence is located 20 feet from the corner of the block. This
determination to admit into evidence the police measurement that
the defendant's residence was within 1,000 feet of a public park
without the proper offering of proof by the prosecution was beyond
the judge's authoritative scope. The measurement is not an item
which "every man or ordinary intelligence must know about such
things" nor is it judicial knowledge which the court is deemed to
know by virtue of its office.
Whether or not a judicially noticed fact of the location of
streets and distances between them can be taken by a court has been
determined by the Utah Supreme Court. In an appeal from the order
dismissing a petition to set aside probate proceedings, the Utah
Supreme Court declared: "We cannot take judicial notice that these
street [University Avenue and Center Street] are in Provo or that
they are actually within 80 yards of each other." In re Phillips'
Estate, 44 P. 2d 699, 705 (Utah 1935) . Subsequent to In re Phillips'
Estate, the Court affirmed its earlier position by stating: "we
cannot take judicial notice of the location of places recited in
the

affidavit

and

without

so

doing

we

cannot

find

improper

posting." Jenkins v. Morgan, 196 P.2d 871, 873 (Utah 1948).
Thus, for the reasons mentioned above, the court exceeded its
scope when admitting into evidence by judicial notice the police
13

measurement of defendant's residence being within 1,000 feet of a
public park.
III.
ASSUMING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE POLICE MEASUREMENT IS
IMPERMISSIBLE, THE PROSECUTION DID NOT ESTABLISH THE
PROPER FOUNDATION FOR ADMISSION OF THE FINDING INTO
EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE WAS WITHIN 1 # 000
FEET OF A PUBLIC PARK.
During

the

trial,

no

testimony

or

evidence

was

ever

established by the prosecution in its offer of proof in determining
that defendant's residence was within 1,000 feet of a public park.
In the subsequent enhancement hearing, an officer gave testimony
that the distance between the park and the residence was measured
by a pedometer, but the officer was not the one who made the
measurement nor could he testify to any questions pertaining to the
accuracy of the pedometer or its calibration. Thus, the prosecution
needs to establish by direct evidence, hearsay exception, or by
statutory authority that the measurement was taken,

results were

obtained, the measurement was accurate, the device which was used
to take the measurement is operable and its reading is reliable.
From the record of the trial and the sentence enhancement hearing,
the prosecution failed to establish this important element in its
case.
Other instruments used by police officers in the field, such
as a breathalyzer, must be supported by the proper foundation in
order

to be

introduced

into evidence

in a court

of

law. For

example, in the case of a breathalyzer, in order to overcome any
direct proof or hearsay exceptions, the Utah legislature enacted a
14

statute which relieves "the State of Utah and other governmental
entities of the financial burden of calling as a witness in every
DUI case the public officer responsible for testing the accuracy of
the breathalyzer equipment"Murray City v. Hall, 663 P. 2d 1314, 1320
(Utah 1983). The Utah Supreme Court went on to conclude:
"Thus, in place of the officer's testimony, § 41-6-44.3
permits the admission of affidavits regarding the
maintenance of a specific breathalyzer as evidence of the
proper functioning of that breathalyzer machine and the
accuracy of the ampoules. However, prior to the
acceptance of those affidavits to establish a presumption
of the validity of the test results, § 41-6-44.3 requires
an affirmative finding by the trial court that (1) the
calibration and testing for accuracy of the breathalyzer
and the ampoules were performed in accordance with the
standards established by the Commissioner of Public
Safety, (2) the affidavits were prepared in the regular
course of the public officer's duties, (3) that they were
prepared contemporaneously with the act, condition, or
event, and (4) the "source of information from which made
and the method and circumstances of their preparation
were such as to indicate their trustworthiness."
Id. , at 1320. In this case, the Utah Supreme Court recognized this
statute as a valid exception to the hearsay rule, but required a
proper foundation for the breathalyzer evidence. In addition, Utah
Admin.R. 735-500-3 (1987) states that a breath testing instrument
must be checked for proper calibration on "a routine basis, not to
exceed forty (4 0) days."
Thus, the prosecution never attempted to establish any direct
evidence, hearsay exception, or statutory authority to show that
defendant's residence is within 1,000 feet of a public park. The
prosecution never established proof of the proper maintenance and
use of the pedometer or provide testimony of the person taking the
measurements of its reading or accuracy. The prosecution failed to
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show that the pedometer is governed by any statutory exception
similar

to

the

administrative

breathalyzer
rule

as

to

or

that

its

it

is

regulated

calibration.

by

Therefore,

an
the

prosecution did not establish the proper foundation for admission
into evidence of the finding that the defendant's residence was
within 1,000 feet of a public park.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the preceding arguments, the lower court's judgment
should be reversed to the extent that it convicted and sentence the
Defendant.
To a First Degree Felony with its minimum mandatory 5 year
provisions and the matter should be remanded to the District Court
with instruction to enter a conviction to the Second Degree Felony
conviction of the jury and a sentence should be entered on the
Second Degree Felony with credit for time served.

DATED this J±j_ day of September, 1995.
BLAINE PERRY MCBRIDE
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

By ^fPy^-^C^SU/ n f?^<^
BLAINE PERRY J^CpRID^/
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